Abstract: Using insights from the classical sociology of deviance and social structure (notably
most acute? Were rises in crime higher in certain areas of Britain than others? Was fear of crime linked to the incidence of crime? We know relatively little beyond the national picture in terms of the economy-crime link. But what is the picture when one explores violent crime or other forms of social harm (such as non-accidental deaths and alcoholism)? Notably, scholars from related branches of social policy have also begun to conduct allied longitudinal investigations in housing policy (Dorling 2014b; Farrall et al. 2016b) , opiate drug-use (Morgan 2014) , education policy (Berridge et al. 2001 ) and social attitudes (Duffy et al. 2013; Natcen 2014) , highlighting the need to build an integrated model of analysis. Moreover, research has demonstrated that how individuals relate to their environment and community can impact their feelings about crime (Farrall, Jackson and Gray 2009 ) as well as the rate of reporting crimes (Goudriaan, Wiiterbrood and Nieuwbeerta 2006) and perception of neighbourhood disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004) . Put simply, the analyses undertaken so far provide us with few answers to these key questions.
In this article we assess the extent to which dramatic economic and social change -and the shocks which it produced in terms of socio-economic processes -was associated with crime at the collective level. Our intellectual framework is derived from thinking developed by Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton, and subsequently revised by Robert Agnew, Steven Messner and Rick Rosenfeld. Our argument is that the new right economic policies of the period had tangible effects on the livelihood and relative prosperity of individuals and families in the UK (creating an 'economic storm') which, in turn, produced a resulting 'social storm', that is an elevated degree of social disruption. Whilst 'storms' are often considered to be short term, we nevertheless term these effects 'storms' because despite their sometimes long-term causes, they were felt immediately (during the 1980s) and had consequences which played out over time. The effects of these storms were like the radiating ripples which follow a stone being dropped into a pond. Our project has found that some of the effects take a very long time to emerge, being produced though processes of political socialisation, for instance (Grasso et al. 2017 ). As such, we treat the concept of social and economic 'storms' as a heuristic device; a useful way of approaching and modelling the effects of politically-initiated social and economic change which can be isolated in time, but which have consequences which emerge over many years. We explore the heuristic value of the idea of such storms by examining the degree to which these were associated with increases in the rate of property crime.
2 This builds on previous work on the economy-crime link, but seeks to better understand the set of social and economic changes that were associated with rising crime rates. These insights may also shed light on why the interrelationship between economy and crime has become less strong since the financial crisis which started in 2007/08.
Similar research which has connected Thatcherite policies to adverse social and economic outcomes has started to be undertaken in other branches of the social and medical sciences. While distinct from our focus on crime rates, studies of changes in health and well-being have pursued similar questions with regards to the effect of government policies on mortality (Scott-Samuel et al. 2014; Shipton, Whyte and Walsh 2013) . For example, Scott-Samuel et al. (2014) find that 'Thatcher's policies were associated with substantial increases in socioeconomic and health inequalities' (p.53), before going on to demonstrate that Thatcherite social and economic policies were associated with the 'unnecessary and unjust death of many British citizens together with a substantial and continuing burden of suffering and loss of well-being' (p.66). Shipton, Whyte and Walsh (2013) use officially-recorded data on the cause of death for three UK cities to show that the cohort of people born in the 1940s and 1950s (and who were in their 30s and 40s during the 1980s) had the highest levels of mortality in Glasgow (one of the regions hardest hit by economic policies during the 1980s), which changed from cardiovascular and heart disease to deaths associated with alcohol, drugs, suicide, and violence.
These cohorts (in their 30s and 40s) may have been amongst those who felt the changes most acutely; younger generations may not have grasped the radical nature of the social and economic changes that took place, while older generations may have escaped their sharp edges via reliance on retirement incomes and the attrition of financial burdens that an older age brings. In a related study, Jackson and Stafford (2009) found a strong statistical link between worry about crime and mental ill-health and physical functioning, suggesting that worry about crime is not only implicated in one's social and political anxieties (Farrall, Jackson and Gray 2009 ), but also fills a discernible role in cycles of decreased health. That crime and public fear of crime were at their height during Conservative rule 3 stresses the need to acknowledge the manifold consequences of neoliberalism on crime and quality of life.
Durkheimian Anomie Theory
It was the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim (1893 Durkheim ( /1960 Durkheim ( , 1897 Durkheim ( /1951 , writing almost a century before the period in which we are interested, who coined the term 'anomie' to refer to the weakening of the social norms of society and the sense of 'dislocation' which this engendered in individual members of society. It was, of course, another sociologist (Merton 1938) anomie as a socially-based set of discontents which routinely generated crime as a by-product of everyday activities which promised everyone great rewards but systematically denied the chances of success to a great many members of society (Rock 2007, p.45) . Like Messner and Rosenfeld (2000) before us, we, too, 'accept Merton's underlying premise that motivations for crime do not result simply from the flaws, failures or free choice of individuals' (p.10). Any account of the causes of crime must attend to the cultural determinants and structural associates of the environments (social, economic, and cultural) in which individuals find themselves and accordingly to which they need to adapt their behaviours and responses. In short, structural-level processes block legal opportunities for advancement, so (some) individuals turn to illegal activities to achieve success/status, or express their frustration at being blocked through criminal behaviour. Robert Agnew (1985) revised this thinking slightly, arguing that feelings of anomie could also be provoked by perceptions that one was 'trapped' in aversive situations. Either way, the basic argument is that structural-level variables prevent individuals from achieving what they desire, and so they turn to illegal activities to achieve these or to express their frustrations. In this perspective, national and regional level crime rates are not simply the 'aggregating up' of individual choices and actions, but rather are the outcomes of the social forces which shape and mediate individual actions and their context. To this end, governments can 'produce' variations in crime rates via their influencing of processes which impact on levels of economic hardship and social welfare. Accordingly, abrupt and deep changes in such processes (especially if they are associated with increases in hardship) can help to structure offending at the individual level. Messner and Rosenfeld (2000) characterise Mertonian thinking by suggesting that 'social norms tend to lose their regulatory force' (p.11) -a point with which we would concur. However, we additionally argue that not only do such social norms lose their power, they are malleable themselves and it is changes in the shape, nature and power of institutions such as the family which mean that their regulatory powers are weakened. 4 Merton argued that the pressure towards anomie was socially structured, becoming greater amongst the lower social strata (since their chances for advancement are weaker) (Wilkinson 2005) . We argue, with regards to the UK's experience during the 1980s, that the lower social strata were most affected by the social and economic changes unleashed by Thatcherite policies. However, and as Rock (2007, p.47) reminds us, Durkheim saw such 'social stress' as being (relatively) short-lived; the birthing pains of a new social and economic order. Regardless of precisely how 'short-lived' such social stress is (is ten years a long or a short period of time, for example?), we have been at pains to chart and document the long-term implications of such periods of rapid change (see Farrall, Burke and Hay 2016a; Farrall et al. 2016b; Jennings et al, 2016; Hay and Farrall 2011) . From this perspective, theories of anomie offer a potential avenue to stretch our understanding of how dramatic social change and shifts in the patterns and pace of crime (such as that experienced during and after the Thatcherite era) impact upon society.
Research Questions
Herein we explore the extent to which the dramatic social and economic changes which the UK experienced during the 1980s were part of the causal processes which led to the rise in crime witnessed in the later part of the 1980s and early 1990s. Crime had been rising steadily from the 1960s throughout the 1970s and into the first half of the 1980s. In 1979 there were 2.5m recorded crimes, which increased to 4.5m by 1990 and peaked in the early to mid-1990s at just under 6m (Britton et al. 2012, p.164) . British Crime Survey data show a similar trend; there were around 11m offences reported in 1981, rising to around 20m in 1995. As we shall show below, at the same time as these increases in the crime rate, the UK experienced increases in a number of key social and economic conditions which have been linked to crime (such as unemployment, economic inequality, drug use, and child poverty). To what extent, if at all, were the changes in the crime rate related to changes in these social and economic conditions?
Data and Methods
Sociologists and criminologists have long been wary of the inferences that can be drawn from officially-recorded crime rates (indeed Merton's reliance on these was one of the criticisms levelled against his work : Box (1971) ). In order to avoid this pitfall, but so as to be able to explore the relationship between macroeconomic and social-structural level change, measures of the economic and social 'storms' observed between 1971 and 2011 are estimated using dynamic factor analysis from official statistical indices, whilst our measures of crime rates are derived from official recorded data and from the British Crime Survey (1982 to 2009) 5 (Jennings et al. 2015) . The analysis in this article uses time series regression methods to examine the relationship between variables of interest over an extended time period. Because of the highly-aggregated nature of our data (that is, national rates of crime), direct impacts of specific socio-economic policies are difficult to detect, and so we model the relationship between general trends in the social and economic organisation of British society and economy and changes in aggregate crime rates. Our theoretical model is presented in Figure 1 . The first of these processes -of the impact of economic policies on macroeconomic outcomes -is not formally modelled here, but has been addressed in existing work (see Farrall and Jennings 2012; Jennings, Farrall and Bevan 2012 , for summaries). There are limits to aggregate-level analyses too, such as the possibility that our measures serve as substitutes for some underlying, but omitted, variable, which requires caution in causal inference -and elevates the importance of theory and methodological diagnoses.
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Creation of Indices of Economic and Social Storms
The idea of a social or economic 'storm' is premised on the sense that key social and economic processes are becoming increasingly unstable and that these 'storms' result in a widespread sense of anomie and dislocation. Inherent in this thinking is the notion that these changes will take place across a number of key indicators at around the same time, and that those trends capture processes that are self-reinforcing in their effects. This might indicate an underlying state of disruption to social norms and behaviours, or a series of economic shocks that impact on national productivity and employment. In this regard, a social storm can be equated with Durkheim's anomie, in describing the confluence of certain conditions which in conjunction may be linked to higher rates of deviance or social harm. Our measure of the 'social storm' is based on four variables measured annually between 1981 and 2011. Whilst it would be preferable to generate a measure that captures longer-term trends in social conditions over the full post-war period, prior to the policy shift marked by the election of the first Thatcher government in 1979, not all the data are available (specifically, suicide rates which are an important macro-level indicator of societal distress, Gilligan (2013) , are not available from the Office for National Statistics as a continuous series prior to 1981). For the purposes of analysis, this starting point means that our conclusions are limited to understanding the relationship between social and economic change and rates of offending over the time period in question, rather than directly testing the impact of individual (or collective) policy interventions on social and economic distress.
Our measure of the social storm is constructed using a range of indicators of social distress, harm, dislocation, and the weakening of norms and social ties. The selection of appropriate indicators is normatively problematic insofar as certain forms of social disruption and change (for example, divorce) correspond both to forms of social breakdown and emancipation (that is, women's social and legal rights). As a result, our principal criterion of selection is that indicators are linked either to distinct social harms or upheavals in the aggregate -even if they also reflect progress in rights of the individual. Further, the method that is used here simply estimates the degree to which defined variables move together over time, and thus the question of what constitutes our measure of social storm is mainly an empirical one that can be resolved through modelling. Nevertheless, it is important to set out some expectations concerning why these indicators of social change and disruption might be both a consequence of economic shocks and restructuring and impact on deviance.
Studies of deviance and criminal behaviour have long emphasised a range of antecedents, including individual characteristics, cognitions and experiences, as well as the powerful roles of youth and political culture, poverty and the environment (Maguire, Morgan and Reiner 2012) .
More recent analysis has indicated that it is highly likely that a combination of factors influence patters of crime (Wikström and Butterworth 2006) via interaction effects, multilevel or hierarchical structures and complex recursive relationships (Nagin and Tremblay 1999; Smith and McVie 2003; Nagin 2005; Smith and Ecob 2007; McAra and McVie 2010a , 2010b , 2012 .
For example, researchers have developed a general theory of moral action -Situational Action Theory -which examines how personal and environmental characteristics interact to influence acts of crime (Wikström 2004; Wikström et al. 2012) . While our analysis does not operate at the level of the individual, we aim to incorporate a set of indices of the social storm that also represent an integrated analytical framework. Our initial set of indices comprise of the following:
 Suicide rate: the age-standardised rate of suicides per 100,000 of population; where suicide is defined as 'deaths given an underlying cause of intentional self-harm or injury/poisoning of undetermined intent' (Office for National Statistics 2016b). While suicide itself is a measure of societal distress and malaise, and tracks rises in the rate of unemployment (Nordt et al. 2015) , it can also have secondary effects on the well-being and financial circumstances of surviving family members who may be forced into reliance on illicit earnings in the absence or loss of income following the death of a family member. Studies of the survivors of suicides has indicated that many family members often report feelings of guilt, shame, stigmatisation, loss of social support and self-destructive behaviour, some of which may result in criminal behaviours (Calhoun, Selby and Selby 1982) .
 Death due to drug misuse: the total number of deaths due to drug-poisoning involving illegal opiates (that is, heroin, morphine, methadone); which measures the level of drug abuse and misuse in society, specifically relating to 'hard' or 'Class A' drugs.
Drug addiction has been linked to regional variation in rates of property crime (Morgan 2014 ) and other acquisitive crimes (Parker and Newcombe 1987) while rates of drug use themselves indicate rates of lawbreaking and permissiveness.
 Divorce rate: the rate of divorce per 1,000 of married population; which measures changing social norms in relation to marriage as well as relationship breakdowns that in some cases impact on children. This might in some cases be directly linked to economic conditions via pressure on relationships via unemployment, relocation for the purposes of employment or increased stresses brought on by financial hardship.
Similarly, divorce may weaken parental bonds (Amato and Sobolewski 2001) , known to be a protective factor against involvement in crime (Hirschi 1969; Sampson and Laub 1993) . Children of divorced parents are more likely to drop out of school (Rodgers and Rose 2001) , itself associated with offending (Farrington 1990 (Farrington , 1992 .
 Teen pregnancy rate: the number of conceptions per 1,000 women aged 15 to 17
years. The rate of teen pregnancies provides a potential measure of a breakdown in traditional family structures, and discipline, which downstream impacts on deviance.
These pregnancies are the result of early sexual encounters, which have been associated with school truancy, teenage drinking, drug use, and juvenile delinquency (Farrington 1990 Each of these indicators provide a distinct signal of social stress and disruption, and changing social norms and breakdowns of control, community or family cohesion, that may result from economic change and restructuring and which may, in turn, impact on deviance. Dynamic factor analysis (Drukker and Gates 2011) is used to summarise the underlying tendency in the identified social indices (as in Whiteley et al. 2013) . This method calculates a single factor, with scores for each latent factor reported in Table 1 . 6 We standardise each of the constituent variables (subtracting the mean of the series from each value and dividing by the standard deviation) in order to be able to directly compare the relative degree to which each variable loads onto the principal factor. Here we see that the unobserved factor is a significant predictor of each of the observed variables, with the exception of the suicide and teen pregnancy rate; where the positive and significant coefficients of similar magnitude for rates of child poverty, divorce and opiate-related deaths due to drug poisoning reveal common variation over time. 7 Additionally, the lag of the unobserved factor (F t-1 ) exhibits a high degree of persistence (0.986, p < 0.001).
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Visual inspection of the estimated dynamic factor, shown in Figure 2 , provides further insight into the shared trajectory of these social indicators. This reveals that the social storm dynamic factor rose throughout the 1980s, peaking in around 1994, and declined before rising briefly around 2002/03, and falling thereafter. This is largely consistent with an underlying dynamic of social change, as put forward in accounts of considerable social dislocation and turbulence during the early 1980s: rising child poverty, and growing rates of divorce and drug mortality (Farrall and Hay 2014) .
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As we noted earlier, the idea of an economic storm can be equated with the confluence of various economic shocks and/or trends that impact on national (and regional) wealth, productivity and We again use dynamic factor analysis to estimate the underlying tendency (single factor) in the identified indices. The results are reported in Table 2 . 10 These reveal a high degree of persistence in the lag of the unobserved factor (0.993, p < 0.001), which is a significant predictor of each of the observed variables. Positive coefficients for the standardised rates of male unemployment, income inequality, housing repossessions, benefits expenditure, and relative poverty, reveal that worsening economic conditions tend to be observed in common across a range of indices. The negative coefficient for average earnings suggests that growth of incomes moves consistently in the opposite direction.
The availability of these various economic series for the earlier time period allows us to observe the trend in the estimated dynamic factor prior to the change in the economic policy paradigm of the British government in 1979 (see Hall 1993) . This is plotted in Figure 3 .
Following relative stability throughout the 1970s, the economic storm index exhibits a steady increase from 1981 onwards (as unemployment, inequality, benefits spending, housing repossessions, and poverty, all rise in tandem), temporarily falling during the late 1980s but only seeing a sustained decline after 1994/95. Estimation of the unobserved factor thus is consistent with many characterisations of the economic turbulence of this period (Dorling 2014a; Walker 2014) .
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Testing the Impact of Social and Economic Storms on Property Crime
Estimation of these unobserved factors enables us to describe the dominant underlying We start by considering the relationship between the economic and social storm indices, using a time series regression model in first differences. This considers the annual change in the social storm measure (∆SocialStorm t ) as a function of change in the economic change measure during the same time period (∆EconomicStorm t ) and can be expressed in the form:
The model is fitted using the Prais-Winsten method (Prais and Winsten 1954) to control for serial autocorrelation of the residuals (µ t ), estimated as the first-order autoregressive process: µ t = µ t-1 +  t . The results of the time series regression model are reported in Table 3 . 12 Here we see that changes in the social storm measure are associated with changes in the economic storm measure, as the effect is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level (0.511, p < 0.05), as hypothesised. The common underlying trajectory of economic conditions can therefore be linked to the common underlying tendency of key measures of social change, disruption and dislocation.
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Returning to our principal concern, whether economic and social change were associated with increased rates of crime during the 1980s, we first estimate the impact of change in the economic storm measure on the rate of recorded property crime. This, again, takes the form of a time series regression model in first differences, estimated with the Prais-Winsten method (Prais and Winsten 1954) . The first lag of recorded property crime (Crime t-1 ) is included as a variable on the right-hand side of the model to control for the tendency for crime rates to revert to their long-run equilibrium (as indicated by a negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable).
The results are reported in the left-hand column (Model 1) of Table 4 . These are consistent with expectations, as the positive and significant effect of change in the economic storm measure is associated with a 1.6 point increase in the rate of recorded property crime per 1,000 head of population (1.634, p < 0.05). At the same time, the effect of the lag of the property crime rate has a negative and significant effect (-0.147, p < 0.05) , where the value of the coefficient of equal to -0.15 means that after an initial one-point shock, some 85% of that shock remains after the first year (1*0.85), some 0.72% remains after the second year (1*0.85*0.85), and so on. When we restrict the model to the same period for which we also have data on the social storm (from 1982 to 2009) (Model 2), the general inferences that can be drawn remain the same, though the size of the effect of economic storm on the recorded crime rate is greater (2.027, p < 0.05) as is the rate of re-equilibration (-0.571, p < 0.01).
The final step of our analysis considers the effect of social and economic storm measures in the same model on the recorded rate of property crime. This is reported in the right-hand column of Table 4 (Model 3), and can be compared against the base model in Model 2. Together, the results indicate that while changes in the economic storm are a positive and significant predictor of changes in the property crime rate, changes in the social storm index are not. This could be because the social storm did not have a material effect on crime rates during this period.
When property crime is modelled just as a function of social storm, the effect is not significant.
This suggests that the social storm had neither a direct or mediating role in the processes observed here. Another explanation is that the social storm index and property crime are simultaneous outcomes of underlying changes in the economic system (modelled here in the form of the economic storm). Another possibility is that the effects of social disruption cancel out in the aggregate, and do not give rise to clear patterns. This would all suggest that property crime is reducible to economic variables, and that the association between social variables and property crime is spurious. In which case, the theoretical model would need to be revised (see Figure 4) . From our findings, this seems most likely in the absence of observed direct effects of the social storm on the recorded crime rate.
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Conclusion
We have examined the impact of what might be termed 'Thatcherite' social and economic policies and their consequences for crime rates in England and Wales over the period between 1971 and 2011. Our initial model proposed that changes in the management of the economy would result in economic turbulence which would create both social turbulence and an increase in crime. Certainly, the analysis herein indicates that economic disturbance was a reliable predictor of rises in property crime in the 1980s and 1990s. We also hypothesised that the social turbulence produced during this time would also contribute to the rising crime rate. This aspect of the model was not as we had hypothesised, and the social storm did not have the significant impact on crime that the economic storm had. However, our analysis broadly supports our initial thinking that the changes to the operation of the economy drove both social changes and change in the rates of crime in England and Wales. Specifically, rapid-onset neoliberal economic policy in Britain in the late part of the 20th Century contributed towards a surge in property crime.
In this respect, crime ought to be seen alongside other dramatic social developments, such as rises in the rates of suicide, divorce, drug overdoses, teen pregnancy and child poverty.
Whilst processes such as divorce may represent greater levels of female emancipation and for the individuals concerned may be positive outcomes, they are also associated with other processes (both for the individuals directly concerned, or for their children) with less positive outcomes. This is not to repeat, of course, the New Right's claim during the 1980s that 'permissiveness'
was the direct cause of crime (claims made by the likes of Victoria Gillick and Mary Whitehouse, see David (1986, pp.158-62) ), but rather to point to the fact that changes in the economic arrangement in England and Wales was the driver of both the increases in the crime rate witnessed in the 1980s and increases in the social changes which so concerned New Right thinkers of the time.
The economic restructuring of the 1980s was both profound (that is to say, felt dramatically by many sections of the economy, some of which shrunk considerably and some of which grew enormously) and enduring in two respects. The processes of change themselves took time to be completed, and when completed then endured, becoming the 'new normal'. Even so, the speed with which the restructuring took place would have felt, for many people within the communities affected, quite rapid. Jobs (and futures) which appeared certain for many would have started to appear less concrete and then to disappear within a decade or less. Unlike the profound changes which followed the end of the Second World War, during which the welfare state was slowly developed over a period of 30 or so years, the changes of the 1980s took hold in a relatively short period of time. What lessons does our modelling have for understanding when such storms arise and the future more generally? The storms we have described were the result of political decision making which sought to both undo much of what had gone before and to create a rather vaguely described future (of homeowners, shareowners, and free markets). Predicting the future is never a wise thing to do and crime patterns are exceptionally difficult to estimate;
however, in the light of the vote for the UK to leave the EU, it is possible to see how the dramatic economic consequences of this decision may result in increases in both social harms and increases in property crime -albeit in new forms, such as online and bank card fraud.
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Significantly, the research herein emphasises the value of economic or structural perspectives in explaining certain types of crime, even if they had been otherwise eclipsed by recent intellectual or cultural 'turns' (Hall 2011 Merton, did not suggest any simple link between poverty and crime, but envisaged an anomic culture produced by materialism and consumerism that was both demoralising and criminogenic.
Our analysis points to a similarly nuanced relationship between the economy, neoliberalism and property crime (Taylor 1994; Reiner 2007) . As the data suggest, the combined effect of rapid unemployment, inequality and loss of tenure had a disruptive effect on acquisitive crime. Beyond the economy, Reiner (2007) has stressed that neoliberalism in Britain during the Thatcher and
Major administrations initiated exclusionary (anomic) social and criminal justice policies and encouraged punitive social attitudes, noting that neoliberal political culture favoured 'egotistic individualism' over 'reciprocal individualism', the latter of which had been prevalent in the post-war consensus (p.18). Certainly Thatcherite policies were attempting to impart a cultural as well as economic change; one that would embrace personal responsibility, enterprise and penalise what was perceived as a 'dependency culture' (Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992) . In sum, the neoliberal capitalism of the Thatcher and Major years serves as an example of the influence which political decision making about the management of the economy can play in increasing property crime rates.
15 which added over a quarter of a million violence offences after 1998/99 (see Maguire (2012, p.216) on the former and Maguire (2007, p.259) on the latter), though trends in the rate of property crime and violent crime are, nevertheless, highly correlated.
Appendix).
7 That the suicide and teen pregnancy rates did not load onto the estimated factor raises a common question for statistical analysis: should one present a theoretically specified model and retain variables which are not significant, or does one present a 'reduced form' model dropping insignificant variables? As it was, the dynamic factor model includes variance parameters for each of the variables, and these were significant for both. This means that the measures did contribute to the model, even if the independent variables themselves are not statistically significant. Hence we opted to retain these variables since there were good theoretical and statistical reasons for doing so.
8 Tests of variance parameters against zero ( 2  ) indicate that for each of the suicide rate, child poverty rate, teen pregnancy rate, and opiate-related deaths due to drug poisoning this is significantly greater than or equal to zero. This is not the case for the divorce rate. Appendix).
11 The correlation between the economic and social storms was 0.77 (p = 0.000).
12 It is possible to further assess the temporal relationships between social and economic storms using tests of 'Granger causation' (Granger 1969) . These determine whether past values of a variable x improve prediction of another variable y, relative to prediction of y from past values of itself alone. This is not a test of causation in the strictest sense, but evidence of the predictive content and the temporal ordering of one measure in relation to another (Granger 1988) . We test for Granger causation between social and economic storms (in first differences) using a vector-autoregression framework, with the lag order (of two years) selected according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The results of the Granger causation tests are reported in . We thus have confidence that the causal direction runs from economic shocks and dislocation to social disturbance rather than vice versa. 13 The nature of property crime is changing, and is currently difficult to analyse. Offences which are committed via the Internet and card and bank account fraud are not currently reliably captured by recorded crime statistics or survey-based studies of victimisation or worry about crime. To address the increasing prevalence of these crimes the Crime Survey for England and Wales added new questions relating to fraud and computer misuse in half of the survey sample from October 2015. These new and experimental statistics found that 'adults aged 16 and over experienced an estimated 5.8 million fraud and computer misuse incidents in the 12 months prior to interview; 3.8 million of these were fraud incidents and 2 million were computer misuse incidents' (Office for National Statistics 2016a, p.7). (Notes: *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.) (Notes: *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.) (Notes: *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Granger causation test in first differences.)
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